Ith Reference to Art Theft the Abbreviation Nsaf Stands for

Volume Ii

Chapter 1: How a virtue of character is acquired

Moral virtue, "like the arts, is acquired by repetition of the respective acts" (trans. W.D. Ross's annotation).

[M]oral virtue comes near as a outcome of habit. . . [W]eastward are adapted by nature to receive [the virtues]."

VIRTUE, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires feel and time), while moral virtue comes about every bit a result of habit, whence likewise its (ethike) is i that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit).

From this it is also plainly that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for aught that exists by nature can form a habit opposite to its nature. For example the stone which by nature moves downwardly cannot exist habituated to motion upward, not fifty-fifty if 1 tries to train it by throwing it upwards ten thousand times; nor tin burn down exist habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that past nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor opposite to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adjusted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect past habit.

Again, of all the things that come up to the states by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later showroom the activeness (this is plain in the instance of the senses; for information technology was not by often seeing or often hearing that nosotros got these senses, but on the opposite we had them before we used them, and did not come to accept them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, equally also happens in the case of the arts likewise. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men get builders by edifice and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too nosotros go only past doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.

This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who exercise not result it miss their marker, and it is in this that a skillful constitution differs from a bad one.

We become better or worse as a result of habit-forming activity.

Once more, information technology is from the aforementioned causes and past the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will exist good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not and then, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would take been born good or bad at their craft. This, and then, is the instance with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we exercise in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The aforementioned is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men get temperate and good-tempered, others cocky-indulgent and irascible, past behaving in i mode or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in i discussion, states of graphic symbol ascend out of like activities. This is why the activities nosotros exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because united states of america of graphic symbol correspond to the differences between these. Information technology makes no small difference, then, whether we class habits of one kind or of some other from our very youth; it makes a very great deviation, or rather all the deviation.

Chapter ii: Habituation

"These acts cannot be prescribed exactly, merely must avert excess and defect" (trans. Westward.D. Ross's notation).

Since, and so, the nowadays inquiry does not aim at theoretical cognition similar the others (for nosotros are inquiring not in guild to know what virtue is, but in gild to go practiced, since otherwise our research would have been of no use), nosotros must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine besides the nature of the states of graphic symbol that are produced, as we take said. At present, that we must act according to the right dominion is a mutual principle and must be causeless — it will be discussed subsequently, i.e. both what the right rule is, and how it is related to the other virtues. But this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must exist given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very offset that the accounts nosotros demand must be in accordance with the bailiwick-matter; matters concerned with acquit and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, whatsoever more than matters of wellness.

The general business relationship being of this nature, the business relationship of particular cases is even so more than defective in exactness; for they do non autumn under any fine art or precept just the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens likewise in the art of medicine or of navigation. But though our present account is of this nature nosotros must give what assistance we can.

Kickoff, then, allow usa consider this, that it is the nature of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as nosotros see in the case of forcefulness and of wellness (for to proceeds lite on things ephemeral nosotros must use the prove of sensible things); both excessive and lacking practise destroys the force, and similarly beverage or nutrient which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So likewise is it, and then, in the example of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his basis against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to come across every danger becomes rash; and similarly the homo who indulges in every pleasance and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the human being who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a style insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed past excess and defect, and preserved by the mean .

Simply not only are the sources and causes of their origination and growth the aforementioned equally those of their destruction, merely also the sphere of their actualization volition be the aforementioned; for this is also truthful of the things which are more than axiomatic to sense, east.yard. of strength; it is produced by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, and it is the stiff man that volition be most able to do these things. So too is it with the virtues; by abstaining from pleasures we get temperate, and it is when nosotros have become and then that we are most able to abjure from them; and similarly as well in the example of courage; for by being habituated to despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we get brave, and it is when nosotros have go and then that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them.

Chapter iii: The importance of pleasure and hurting

"Pleasure in doing virtuous acts is a sign that the virtuous disposition has been acquired: a diverseness of considerations show the essential connectedness of moral virtue with pleasure and pain" (trans. W.D. Ross's note).

For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains;. . . we ought to have been brought upwards . . . and then as both to delight in and to exist pained by the things that nosotros ought.

We must take as a sign of states of graphic symbol the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at information technology is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains.

It is on account of the pleasance that nosotros exercise bad things, and on business relationship of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to accept been brought upward in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, then every bit both to delight in and to exist pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education. . . .

We assume, then, that this kind of excellence tends to practice what is best with regard to pleasures and pains, and vice does the contrary. . . .

That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that past the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in which information technology actualizes itself- let this exist taken as said.

Affiliate 4: Virtuous actions versus virtuous graphic symbol

Is at that place a paradox in the thought that in order to become excellent, one must perform excellent actions?

The question might be asked, what we mean past saying that we must go merely by doing just acts, and temperate past doing temperate acts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already just and temperate, exactly as, if they do what is in accord with the laws of grammer and of music, they are grammarians and musicians.

Or is this not truthful even of the arts? It is possible to do something that is in accord with the laws of grammar, either by risk or at the suggestion of some other. A man will be a grammarian, then, only when he has both done something grammatical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it in accord with the grammatical cognition in himself.

Virtuous acts are performed

• with cognition rather than by blow;
• for their own sakes;
• from firm character.

Once again, the instance of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the products of the arts take their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a sure character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character information technology does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must exist in a certain condition when he does them; in the kickoff place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his activity must go along from a business firm and unchangeable grapheme. These are not reckoned in equally conditions of the possession of the arts, except the bare knowledge; but equally a condition of the possession of the virtues knowledge has piffling or no weight, while the other atmospheric condition count not for a piddling only for everything, i.e. the very atmospheric condition which effect from often doing just and temperate acts.

Then is there an abstract definition of 'justice', or some expressible rule to which deportment must conform?

Actions, and then, are chosen only and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate human would exercise; just information technology is not the human who does these that is just and temperate, only the human who too does them every bit just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and past doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of condign good.

But most people practice non practise these, merely take refuge in theory and think they are beingness philosophers and will go skillful in this way, behaving somewhat similar patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but practise none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter volition non be made well in body by such a grade of treatment, the old volition non be made well in soul past such a course of philosophy.

Chapter v: Virtue of character: its genus

Virtues are either passions, faculties, or states of character.

Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the soul are of three kinds — passions, faculties, states of character — virtue must be ane of these.

• 'Passions' are "feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain."

  By passions I hateful appetite, anger, fear, conviction, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain;
• by faculties the things in virtue of which nosotros are said to be capable of feeling these, e.thousand. of condign angry or existence pained or feeling compassion;
• by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, eastward.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if nosotros feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions.

Virtues aren't passions . . .

Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because nosotros are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because nosotros are neither praised nor blamed for our passions (for the homo who feels fearfulness or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, only the man who feels information technology in a sure way), but for our virtues and our vices nosotros are praised or blamed.

Over again, nosotros feel anger and fear without selection, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve option. Further, in respect of the passions nosotros are said to be moved, merely in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said non to exist moved but to exist disposed in a particular fashion.

 . . . nor are they faculties (e.g., the capacity of feeling passions) . . .

For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither chosen proficient nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the uncomplicated capacity of feeling the passions; once more, we accept the faculties past nature, merely nosotros are not made good or bad by nature; nosotros accept spoken of this before.

 . . . so they're states of character.

If, and then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character.

Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.

Chapter half dozen: Virtue of character: its differentia

Distinguish virtue from other things in the genus (states of character): it is a disposition to choose the mean.

We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but also say what sort of state information technology is.

Nosotros may remark, and then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the affair of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that matter be done well; due east.grand. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work proficient; for it is by the excellence of the center that we come across well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at conveying its rider and at pending the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every example, the virtue of human being also will be the country of character which makes a homo good and which makes him exercise his own work well.

How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made plain too by the post-obit consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to have more, less, or an equal corporeality, and that either in terms of the affair itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between backlog and defect. By the intermediate in the object I hateful that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is neither also much nor as well petty- and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and ii is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to the states is not to be taken so; if x pounds are too much for a detail person to consume and 2 too lilliputian, information technology does non follow that the trainer volition order vi pounds; for this also is perhaps as well much for the person who is to take information technology, or too footling- too little for Milo, too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The aforementioned is true of running and wrestling. Thus a chief of any fine art avoids backlog and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this – the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.

The Gilded Mean: virtue lies between extremes.

If it is thus, then, that every fine art does its work well – by looking to the intermediate and judging its works by this standard (so that nosotros often say of adept works of fine art that it is not possible either to have away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of fine art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, await to this in their piece of work), and if, farther, virtue is more exact and ameliorate than any art, as nature also is, and then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for information technology is this that is concerned with passions and deportment, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both besides much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the correct fashion, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions likewise in that location is excess, defect, and the intermediate.

Now virtue is concerned with passions and deportment, in which backlog is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and beingness praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.

[F]ear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity … may be felt both too much and besides little…; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right style, is … characteristic of virtue.

Again, information technology is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, every bit the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible merely in one way (for which reason also 1 is like shooting fish in a barrel and the other difficult — to miss the marking easy, to hit information technology difficult); for these reasons also, and so, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue; for men are good in but one mode, but bad in many.

Virtue defined.

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, 1107a this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the human of practical wisdom would decide it. At present it is a mean between ii vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again information technology is a mean because the vices respectively fall brusk of or exceed what is correct in both passions and deportment, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is all-time and correct an farthermost.

Just non every action nor every passion admits of a hateful; for some have s that already imply badness, e.one thousand. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their s that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is non possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; i must e'er be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right fourth dimension, and in the correct way, only simply to do any of them is to go incorrect.

It would exist as cool, and then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action at that place should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that charge per unit in that location would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an backlog of backlog, and a deficiency of deficiency. Merely as at that place is no backlog and deficiency of temperance and courage because what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so besides of the actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are done they are incorrect; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.

Chapter seven: The particular virtues of character

The Golden Hateful: As introduced in the previous paragraph, Aristotle proposes that virtue lies betwixt extremes, like a mean or average. This doctrine is here illustrated by reference to specific virtues.

Temperance or moderation is σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē), a mean between "licentiousness" (self-indulgent / excessive) and "insensibility" (emotionally unmovable / "deficient with regard to the pleasures"). (This virtue made Plato's short-list.)

We must, however, non only brand this general statement, but also apply it to the individual facts. For amongst statements about conduct those which are full general utilize more widely, but those which are detail are more genuine, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and our statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases. We may take these cases from our tabular array.

Chart from BC Resources . internet; based on the Tredennick translation.

With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, 1107b he who exceeds in fearlessness has no (many of the states have no ), while the man who exceeds in conviction is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in conviction is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains — not all of them, and non so much with regard to the pains — the mean is temperance, the excess cocky-indulgence. Persons scarce with regard to the pleasures are not frequently found; hence such persons also have received no proper noun. But let usa phone call them 'insensible'.

With regard to giving and taking of coin the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall brusk in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls brusk in taking, while the hateful human exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. (At nowadays nosotros are giving a mere outline or summary, and are satisfied with this; later these states will exist more exactly adamant.) With regard to money there are besides other dispositions — a hateful, magnificence (for the magnificent homo differs from the liberal man; the former deals with big sums, the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and the mode of their difference volition exist stated afterward. With regard to laurels and dishonour the mean is proper pride, the excess is known equally a sort of 'empty vanity', and the deficiency is undue humility; and as nosotros said liberality was related to magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, then there is a state similarly related to proper pride, beingness concerned with small honours while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire laurels every bit ane ought, and more than ane ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls brusque unambitious, while the intermediate person has no name. . . . .

There are also three other means  . . . all concerned with intercourse in words and actions . . . We must therefore speak of these too, that we may the better see that in all things the hateful is praise-worthy, and the extremes neither praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of arraign. Now nigh of these states also accept no s, but we must try, every bit in the other cases, to invent s ourselves and then that we may be articulate and easy to follow. With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a true sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by information technology a boaster, and that which understates is mock modesty and the person characterized past it mock-modest. With regard to pleasantness in the giving of amusement the intermediate person is gear up-witted and the disposition ready wit, the excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by information technology a buffoon, while the human who falls short is a sort of boor and his country is boorishness. With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the homo who is pleasant in the correct style is friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own reward, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person . . . .

Chapter 9: How tin can nosotros attain the mean?

[A]ny 1 can get angry — that is easy. . .; only to practice this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right manner, that is not . . . easy.

That moral virtue is a mean, so, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean betwixt two vices, the one involving backlog, the other deficiency, and that information technology is such because its character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated.

Hence too it is no like shooting fish in a barrel task to exist skillful. For in everything it is no like shooting fish in a barrel task to observe the heart, e.g. to observe the middle of a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; and then, too, any i can become angry — that is piece of cake — or requite or spend coin; simply to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right fourth dimension, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble.

Hence he who aims at the intermediate must get-go depart from what is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises-

Concur the ship out across that surf and spray.

For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore, since to striking the hateful is hard in the farthermost, we must as a 2d all-time, as people say, take the least of the evils; and this volition exist washed all-time in the way nosotros draw. But we must consider the things towards which nosotros ourselves too are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this volition exist recognizable from the pleasance and the pain we experience. We must drag ourselves abroad to the contrary extreme; for nosotros shall go into the intermediate state past drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.

At present in everything the pleasant or pleasance is most to be guarded against; for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, and then, to feel towards pleasure equally the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and in all circumstances repeat their maxim; for if nosotros dismiss pleasure thus we are less probable to go astray. Information technology is by doing this, then, (to sum the affair upward) that we shall best be able to hit the mean.

Merely this is no doubt hard, and particularly in individual cases; for information technology is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall curt and call them good-tempered, only sometimes we praise those who get aroused and call them manly. The man, yet, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he practise and so in the management of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. Just upward to what indicate and to what extent a human being must deviate earlier he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on detail facts, and the determination rests with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate land is in all things to be praised, only that nosotros must incline sometimes towards the backlog, sometimes towards the deficiency; for and then shall we most easily hit the mean and what is right.

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